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DIFFUSION OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PRACTICES: 
THE DUTCH RESPONSE TO PRESSURES FOR SHAREHOLDER VALUE 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
As part of a larger literature focused on identifying and relating the antecedents and 
consequences of diffusing organizational practices/ideas, recent research has debated 
the international adoption of a shareholder-value-orientation (SVO). The debate has 
financial economists characterizing the adoption of an SVO as performance-
enhancing and thus inevitable, with behavioral scientists disputing both claims, 
invoking institutional differences. This study seeks to provide some resolution to the 
debate (and advance current understanding on the diffusion of practices/ideas) by 
developing a socio-political perspective that links the antecedents and consequences 
of an SVO. In particular, we introduce the notion of misaligned elites and misfitted 
practices in our analysis of how and why differences in the technical and cultural 
preferences of major owners will influence a firm’s adoption and (un)successful 
implementation of an SVO among the largest 100 corporations in the Netherlands 
from 1992-2006. We conclude with a discussion of the implications of our perspective 
and our findings for future research on corporate governance and the diffusion of 
organizational practices/ideas.  
 
 
Key words: practice/idea diffusion, misfit, shareholder value orientation, ownership 
structure, socio-political processes, and the Netherlands. 
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“There are of course competing claims about the meaning of a paradigm, 
 indeed, about the meaning and significance of any body of beliefs. But none is 
correct,  
and which among them secures local “hegemony” is a matter of social, political, 
economic and other sorts of power” (Rosenberg, 2005:177) 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Despite the long history of the public corporation, its fundamental purpose remains a 
topic of debate among scholars and practitioners around the world (Freeman, Wicks 
and Parmar, 2004; Sundaram and Inkpen, 2004). While coordinated market 
economies (e.g., Germany and Japan) conceptualized corporations as communities of 
interests whose stakeholders should be served, liberal market economies (e.g., the 
United States) typically viewed corporations as instruments for creating value for its 
shareholders (Letza, Sun and Kirkbride, 2004; Stadler et al., 2006). However, recent 
scholarship suggests growing evidence that the systems are converging and that 
executives in contexts with a historical emphasis on stakeholder value, ranging from 
Germany (Fiss and Zajac, 2004; Tüschke and Sanders, 2003) and France (Morin, 
2000) to Japan (Yoshikawa, Tsui-Auch and McGuire, 2007) and Sweden (Lazonick 
and O’Sullivan, 2000), are struggling with pressures for the adoption of a shareholder 
value orientation (SVO). 
The specific antecedents and consequences of a firm’s adoption of an SVO in 
a national context with a pre-existing competing logic has very recently become the 
subject of academic inquiry (Fiss and Zajac, 2004; 2006; Sanders and Tüschke, 2007; 
Yoshikawa Tsui-Auch and McGuire, 2007). Some scholars have suggested that the 
rise of the shareholder value model is driven by capital- and product-market pressures 
(Lazonick and O’Sullivan, 2000; Yoshikawa and Rasheed, 2009). Others have pointed 
to the impact of socio-political processes and the institutional context. For instance, 
Fiss and Zajac (2004; 2006) illustrate how the varying preferences of major domestic 
owners influenced the adoption of an SVO among German firms, and Sanders and 
Tüschke (2007) describe how a company’s exposure to institutional contexts where 
shareholder value practices are more legitimate, increases SVO diffusion across 
national boundaries. 
While this growing literature has expanded our broad understanding of the 
diffusion of an SVO, a number of fundamental questions regarding this diffusion 
process remain unanswered. For example, while large-scale diffusion studies have 
 
 
 4
recently added a focus on contestation in diffusing organizational practices/ideas (Fiss 
and Zajac, 2004), they have not analyzed which specific forces align for (versus 
against) such change. What is the role of outsiders versus insiders in stimulating, 
enforcing, resisting, or implementing change, and when is one group more versus less 
likely to support adoption of these changes? Also, there is little research that 
addresses the performance consequences of diffusing practices under conditions of 
contestation; when changes are needed but also particularly contested, does this also 
portend a subsequent organizational performance improvement or decline? We 
suggest that addressing these adoption and performance questions necessitates a 
socio-political contingency perspective that will take seriously the concept of 
misalignment and misfit in the diffusion of contested practices (cf. Ansari, Fiss and 
Zajac, 2010). We offer and test such a model in this study, and in doing so, hope to 
make the following three contributions to the existing literature. 
First, we extend prior research on the diffusion of organizational practices that 
has taken a socio-political perspective (e.g., Fiss and Zajac, 2004; Westphal and 
Zajac, 1998; 2001; Zajac and Westphal, 1995) by offering an original contingency 
perspective that addresses how and why the misaligned preferences of corporate elites 
will affect: (1) a firm’s inclination to espouse an SVO in a national context dominated 
by an alternate logic, and (2) the performance consequences of such misalignment. In 
contrast to prior diffusion research that has generally accentuated the influence of 
insiders on adoption (Fiss and Zajac, 2004; Maguire and Hardy, 2009), we investigate 
how contestation regarding adoption emerges from the combined impact of outsiders 
and insiders, and how any resulting misalignment of organizational elites will affect 
the adoption and the performance consequences of an SVO. In particular, we analyze 
the contestation between powerful outsiders, i.e., major owners who align themselves 
technically and culturally with this alternative SVO model, and powerful insiders, i.e., 
major owners who align themselves technically and culturally with the status quo in a 
particular firm. We contextualize this analysis by examining how and why investors 
and financial institutions aligned with an Anglo-American orientation would be the 
primary instigators of the shift towards an SVO in a stakeholder-oriented context 
(Lane, 2003; Yoshikawa, Tsui-Auch and McGuire, 2007), and why having such 
outsider-driven diffusion would also exert a negative effect on firm performance.  
Second, given that the contexts in which practices diffuse are far from neutral 
(Ansari, Fiss and Zajac, 2010; Schneper and Guillen, 2004) and often highly political 
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(Cyert and March, 1963; Davis and Thompson, 1994), we analyze how additional 
macro and micro political factors will affect the technical and cultural factors that 
generate (mis)alignment among the corporate elite. We see this blending of political, 
technical and cultural factors in diffusion and its consequences as an important 
advance that is consistent with growing broader recognition that when 
institutionalized practices are highly resistant to change (Granovetter, 1985; Reay and 
Hinings, 2005), it is due to their embeddededness in social phenomena such as 
national belief systems, which themselves reflect the distribution of power in societies 
(Jürgens, Naumann and Rupp, 2000; Yoshikawa and Rasheed, 2009). We therefore 
extend our central arguments regarding misaligned elites by incorporating additional 
micro/macro political inhibitors of practice adoption. In doing so, we hope to add 
additional clarity to recent research that has suggested that the shift towards the 
shareholder value model has perhaps been overstated (Morris, Hassard and McCann, 
2008), that symbolism plays an important role as firms might decouple espousal from 
implementation (Fiss and Zajac, 2004) and that the Anglo-American push towards a 
shareholder orientation may actually result in “hybrid models” in which core elements 
of the old logic are being preserved (Guillen, 2001; Yoshikawa, Tsui-Auch and 
McGuire, 2007; Yoshikawa and McGuire, 2008).  
Third, while prior research has focused either exclusively or primarily on the 
antecedents of SVO adoption, our study theoretically and empirically integrates the 
antecedents and performance consequences of a company’s adopting an SVO. 
Opinions as to the simple relationship between SVO adoption and performance are 
quite varied. For example, one can find strong statements that suggest a negative 
relationship between the espousal of an SVO and performance in a stakeholder-
oriented context, e.g., “End shareholder value tyranny: Put the corporation first” 
(Raynor, 2008) and “So if others are stupid enough to do it [adopting an SVO], that 
will only help North American businesses” (Mintzberg, 2000:38). However, there is 
very little, large-scale, firm-level evidence to support or refute such a view.1 We see 
the antecedents and consequences questions as intertwined, and our original 
contribution is in our theoretical and empirical analysis of how and why downward 
performance pressure will apply most strongly when corporate elites are misaligned 
(creating misfitted organizational change) and how this misalignment can be partly 
                                                 
1 Fiss and Zajac (2006), one of the few studies to examine this, find a positive relationship between 
SVO adoption and market performance. 
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attenuated using technical corrections such as executive long-term incentive plans. We 
also use our framework to examine the open question regarding the performance 
consequences of symbolic versus substantive adoption (cf. Fiss and Zajac, 2004; 
2006). 
We conduct our research within the Netherlands, a small and open economy 
heavily reliant on the global economy. While prior research in this area has mainly 
focused on larger economies, such as Germany (Fiss and Zajac, 2004; 2006; Sanders 
and Tüschke, 2007) and Japan (Yoshikawa, Tsui-Auch and McGuire, 2007; 
Yoshikawa and McGuire, 2008), we view the Dutch setting as well-suited to the study 
of misaligned elites and misfitted change, given the combination whereby large Dutch 
companies are less buffered against international capital market pressures, yet also 
typically led by Dutch managerial elites that are a particularly cohesive social group 
(e.g., Bezemer et al., 2007; Heemskerk, 2007; Van Ees, Postma and Sterken, 2003). 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: section one briefly 
introduces the Dutch context and highlights its relevance and its main particularities. 
In section two, we advance our socio-political perspective and develop our hypotheses 
regarding the technical, cultural, and political sources of misalignment among elites 
and their impact on a firm’s espousal of an SVO and its likely performance 
implications. Section three describes our data and methods, i.e., our use of extensive 
panel data on top-100 listed Dutch firms from 1992 to 2006 and our empirical 
analyses. In section four we discuss the results emerging from our study and in section 
five we elaborate on our findings, their implications and avenues for future research. 
 
THE DUTCH CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CONTEXT 
The roots of the contemporary Dutch open-economy can be found in the glory days of 
the Golden Age (1600-1700). In this era, when the Netherlands were one of the 
largest trading nations, the Dutch founded the “Dutch United East India Company”, 
one of the first joint stock companies in the world. With a small group of large, 
internationally diversified firms and a GDP that is earned abroad for more than 60 per 
cent, the Dutch trade origins and its international orientation are still prominent. The 
Netherlands are a welfare state with a long tradition of balancing the interests of 
societal groups. The Dutch corporate governance system is unique in the sense that 
company law explicitly defines publicly listed firms as legal entities that must take 
into account the rights of all stakeholders affected by the firm. The institutionalized 
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stakeholder approach is supported by a two-tier board model consisting of a 
management board and a supervisory board. The supervisory board consists of non-
executive directors to assure its independence and has the duty by law to supervise 
and advice the management board while acting in the best interests of the company 
and its stakeholders (Bezemer et al., 2007; De Jong et al. 2005; Hooghiemstra and 
Van Manen, 2004). 
 Within the Dutch institutionalized stakeholder model, it has been put forward 
that management basically holds “the control rights of the firm” instead of the 
shareholders (Van Ees, Postma and Sterken: 2003:92). Hostile takeovers have been 
rare for a long period (Groot, 1998; Kabir, Cantrijn and Jeunink, 1997) and, until 
more recently, shareholders have not been pursuing their own agendas actively 
(Chirinko et al., 2004; De Jong, Mertens and Roosenboom, 2006). Three distinct 
features of the Dutch corporate governance system largely explain the entrenched 
position of management.  
First, while the market for corporate control is active in the United States and 
the United Kingdom (Lazonick and O’Sullivan, 2000), the Dutch market for corporate 
control used to be severely constrained by several anti-investor protection measures 
(Chirinko et al., 2004; Kabir, Cantrijn and Jeunink, 1997). Examples include 
preference shares and tradable depository receipts. Preference shares are shares with 
normal voting rights that can be issued against 25% of the nominal value to a 
“friendly” holder in case management feels threatened, thereby increasing their voting 
power for a limited period. Tradable depository receipts are shares with normal cash 
flow rights, but without any voting power, i.e., the voting rights reside with a trust 
office that is usually “friendly” to the board. 
 Second, while dispersed ownership is common in the United States and the 
United Kingdom, the Dutch context used to be characterized by large blockholdings 
by domestic institutional investors. In particular, financial institutions, such as banks, 
insurance companies and pension funds, used to have large ownership stakes in Dutch 
listed firms (Van Ees, Postma and Sterken, 2003). Scholars have proposed that their 
presence may alleviate agency problems that remain due to the (in)active market for 
corporate control, as institutional investors have the power and incentives to actively 
monitor managers in the light of the limited liquidity of their investments 
(Dharwadkar et al., 2008; Schnatterly, Shaw and Jennings, 2008). The majority of 
these domestic institutional investors, however, used to have a rather “passive 
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attitude” (De Jong et al., 2005:482) and has been characterized as “long-term, patient 
investors” (Chirinko et al., 2004:125). The rather passive attitude of institutional 
investors is illustrated by low attendance rates at annual general meetings of 
shareholders and the limited number of rejected proposals which were sponsored by 
the management (De Jong, Mertens and Roosenboom, 2006).   
 Third, the entrenched position of managers is supported by a small elite 
community of board members, referred to as the “old-boys network”, which used to 
occupy a central position in the Dutch network of board interlocks. In particular, the 
top-three listed banks (ABN Amro, Fortis and ING) played a central role in this 
network during the nineties (Bezemer et al., 2007; Heemskerk, 2007). Elite 
membership was often associated with highly prestigious functions in societal interest 
groups and membership of exclusive dining clubs. An important characteristic of this 
elite has been their support for the institutionalized stakeholder model which resulted 
in various efforts to reinforce this model in the Dutch boardrooms. 
 So far, our discussion of the Dutch corporate governance context has 
illustrated the institutionalized nature of the stakeholder model in the Dutch society 
and the resulting entrenched position of managers. However, over the last years, 
Dutch financial markets have seen dramatic changes. The globalization and 
liberalization of the financial market, (self)regulatory initiatives, corporate 
governance scandals and societal pressure have led to broadened shareholder rights, 
increased shareholder activism, abolished anti-investor protection devices and 
disintegrating managerial elite networks (Bezemer et al., 2007; Heemskerk, 2007). It 
is in this evolving research setting that we aim to enhance our understanding of the 
spread of an SVO among large listed firms in a small, open economy. 
 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
A growing body of research on change has emphasized the importance of socio-
political processes driving the diffusion of organizational practices (Westphal and 
Zajac, 1998; 2001; Zajac and Westphal, 1995; 2004), i.e., companies do not only need 
to deal with demands from their technical environments, but also with demands from 
their cultural environments. Accordingly, the interpretations of organizational and 
societal actors about “the way things are” and “the way things are to be done” (Scott, 
1987:496) have a significant imprint on their responses to new beliefs, logics and 
practices. In fact, firms may adopt practices, structures or strategies for motives of 
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societal legitimacy rather than efficiency (Davis, 1991; Westphal and Zajac, 1994) or 
even with the knowledge that the practice, structure or strategy is technically 
inefficient (Yoshikawa and Rasheed, 2009). Moreover, scholars have shown that 
symbolism, i.e., espousing the adoption of new normative beliefs without 
implementing them, may already generate market reactions, because prevailing 
financial market logics also tend to be socially constructed (Westphal and Zajac, 
1998; Zajac and Westphal, 2004). 
 Given our earlier comments regarding how corporate practices are embedded 
in social phenomena such as national belief systems and reflect the distribution of 
power in societies, it should not be surprising that our socio-political perspective sees 
corporate control as the outcome of the struggle between varying preferences and 
motivations of involved actors. While several actors have an interest to be involved in 
this process (Jensen and Warner, 1988; Schneper and Guillen, 2004; Yoshikawa and 
Rasheed, 2009), in particular, controlling shareholders have incentives to participate in 
the light of the limited liquidity of their investments (Dharwadkar et al., 2008; 
Schnatterly, Shaw and Jennings, 2008). Accordingly, several studies have indicated 
that the dispositions of major owners are reflected in a company’s value orientation. 
For example, Brouthers, Gelderman and Arens (2007) describe that government 
ownership has a significant imprint on a company’s strategic orientation and 
managers’ leadership style. Furthermore, Fiss and Zajac (2004) illustrate that varying 
preferences of major domestic owners influenced the espousal of an SVO among 
German firms. In the next section, we build on this argument and introduce the notion 
that the diffusion of an SVO can be understood as driven by the level of technical and 
cultural fit between the values of the corporate elites and that of the practice itself. 
Accordingly, we suggest that when misalignment exists among elites, both the 
likelihood of SVO adoption and its performance benefit will diminish.  
 
Technical Fit, Cultural Fit and Contested Organizational Change 
With regard to the spread of the SVO, we expect that a firm’s espousal is most likely 
to be stimulated from without, i.e., by powerful owners who align themselves 
technically and/or culturally with the shareholder value model. They may stimulate 
the adoption in several ways. First, these owners might acquaint a firm with 
alternative logics, mental models and norms, thereby educating managers about the 
merits of the shareholder value model (Elsbach and Kramer, 1996; Maguire and 
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Hardy, 2009; Sanders and Tüschke, 2007). Second, these owners might put more 
pressure on managers to reflect on their current logics, mental models and norms, and 
to pay more attention to the creation of shareholder value (Jürgens, Naumann and 
Moore, 2002; Yoshikawa, Tsui-Auch and McGuire, 2007). Accordingly, Kraatz and 
Moore (2002) argue that the entrance of a powerful actor with a different background 
is often necessary to overthrow prevailing institutions. Third, managers might monitor 
the ownership composition of their company and symbolically or substantively react 
to meet the expectations of their (new) owners and reassure their long-term 
commitment (Lane, 2003). 
 However, while outsiders might have the willingness and incentives to act as a 
change agent, they may encounter embedded norms and values, and power 
constellations that are highly resistant to change (Maguire and Hardy, 2009; 
Yoshikawa and Rasheed, 2009). In particular, “insiders” might have an interest in 
resisting the spread of contested beliefs (Fiol and O’Connor, 2002; Munir, 2005). As 
contested change resembles the disruption of taken for granted norms, values and 
practices, it often tends to threaten the vested interests and identities of insiders 
(Greenwood and Suddaby, 2006; Hannan et al., 2006). Some scholars have 
highlighted that insiders may also function as champions of change (Lane, 2003; 
Maguire and Hardy, 2009) as they have a better understanding of how to apply and 
adapt new practices in the prevailing institutional context (Greenwood, Hinings and 
Suddaby, 2002). Insiders, however, have generally been associated with resistance to 
change (Pardo Del Val and Martinez Fuentes, 2003). Accordingly, we expect that a 
firm’s espousal is most likely to be opposed from the inside, i.e., by owners who align 
themselves technically and/or culturally with the status quo in a particular firm and its 
governance practices. 
 Following prior work on the diffusion of practices (Ansari, Fiss and Zajac, 
2010; Zeitz, Mittal and McAulay, 1999), two accounts can be given for the 
identification of major owners with the shareholder value model: a technical and a 
cultural one. Regarding the first account, scholars have referred to the shareholder 
value model in technical terms, i.e., as an “instrument of corporate control” (Pfeiffer, 
2000:68) and as a “product and promise that purposive management action will be 
rewarded” (Froud et al., 2000:80). Originating from the field of economics, the 
shareholder value model emphasizes the profit-maximizing function of a firm and is 
generally associated with legitimacy in global financial markets (Ghoshal, 2005; 
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Lazonick and O’Sullivan, 2000). Given the roots of the shareholder value model, 
financial institutions should be more predisposed towards the espousal of an SVO, as 
managers in these companies daily operate in line with the market logic. Not 
surprisingly, recent evidence suggests that private equity and hedge funds are among 
the frontrunners striving for a stronger emphasis on shareholder value in financial 
markets (Clifford, 2008; Klein and Zur, 2009). While financial institutions, as 
“technical outsiders”, may be most inclined to stimulate change, two groups of 
“technical insiders” might be particularly resistant to their initiatives. First, non-
financial corporations might oppose pressures for shareholder value, as they may have 
a better understanding of the risks and implications associated with a disruptive 
change in the value orientation of a company (Fiol and O’Connor, 2002; Hannan et 
al., 2006). Furthermore, non-financial corporations might also anticipate contagion 
effects in their own context, i.e., they might expect to become the next “target” if the 
new logic increasingly gets a foothold. Second, family blockholders might resist 
change, as the long-term survival and prosperity of the family seems to be at odds 
with short-term shareholder value. Accordingly, scholars have illustrated that family 
owners often have a more traditionalist, long-term orientation and often act as 
“protective stewards” of a corporation (Fiss and Zajac, 2004:509; Young et al., 2008). 
In sum, using a socio-political perspective, the technical account suggests that a firm’s 
espousal of an SVO is the product of the balance of power between technical outsiders 
and technical insiders. More formally, this suggests the following hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 1 (HI): The higher the technical misfit between a firm’s major 
owners and a shareholder value orientation (SVO), the less likely the firm is to 
adopt it. 
 
A second stream of research has referred to the shareholder value model in cultural 
terms, arguing that this model is deeply embedded in national economic systems, i.e., 
in the ways in which actors derive their identity within a national context (Zeitz, 
Mittal and McAulay, 1999) and give meaning to the corporation and its main 
purposes (Ansari, Fiss and Zajac, 2010). Particularly, literature on economic 
nationalism suggests that the differences between nations are quite profound and 
persistent (Levi-Faur, 1997) and that domestic actors are likely to respond to foreign 
contested practices by “strong assertions of national differences and identity” 
(Yoshikawa and Rasheed, 2009:394). Therefore, in the context of the spread of an 
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SVO, we expect that “cultural insiders”, i.e., major owners that are familiar with the 
stakeholder model in their own domestic context, will strongly oppose the new logic. 
Being confronted with a new logic that threatens their vested interests, identities and 
taken-for-granted norms and values, these owners are most likely to act as “protective 
stewards” of the traditional stakeholder logic. Conversely, we expect that “cultural 
outsiders”, i.e., owners from abroad that have the shareholder value logic as taken for 
granted in their domestic context, might, in particular, contribute to the spread of an 
SVO. They may educate managers by sharing their experiences with the alternate 
logic or force managers to reflect on the appropriateness of the current logic (Sanders 
and Tüschke, 2007; Yoshikawa, Tsui-Auch and McGuire, 2007). As the shareholder 
model has it historical origins in the United States (Lazonick and O’Sullivan, 2000) 
we expect that Anglo-American oriented major owners will be prime propagators of 
the shift towards an SVO. In conclusion, using a socio-political perspective, the 
cultural account suggests that a company’s espousal of an SVO is the product of the 
balance of power between cultural outsiders and cultural insiders: 
 
Hypothesis 2 (H2): The higher the cultural misfit between a firm’s major 
owners and a shareholder value orientation (SVO), the less likely the firm is to 
adopt it. 
 
Micro-Level Political Resistance 
To this point, we have emphasized the possibility of technical and cultural 
misalignment among corporate elites that are owners of the public corporations and 
the effect of such misalignment on the adoption of an SVO. We now additionally 
consider how and why a push for an SVO by cultural and technical outsiders might 
also be resisted by other (non-owner) organizational elites. Scholars have noted that 
the contexts in which practices diffuse are far from neutral (Ansari, Fiss and Zajac, 
2010; Schneper and Guillen, 2004) and often highly political (Cyert and March, 1963; 
Davis and Thompson, 1994). As a result of the misalignment between the proponents 
and detractors of an SVO, major owners for change might encounter internal political 
resistance. The new SVO logic may, in particular, endanger the position of top 
managers. For decades they have operated according to taken-for-granted logics of the 
stakeholder model, and the new logic implies that they are expected to relinquish a 
part of their discretion and power to the market. 
 Scholars, however, have noted that managers’ sensitivity to external pressures 
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depends on the extent to which they have managed to obtain an entrenched position 
(Jiraporn and Chintrakarn, 2009; Sundaramurthy, 2000), i.e., the extent to which they 
possess “the control rights of the firm” (Van Ees, Postma and Sterken, 2003:92). Due 
to the separation of ownership and control in public companies, managers have a 
certain amount of discretion to determine a company’s direction and, as a result, 
leeway to act opportunistically (Eisenhardt, 1989; Jensen and Meckling, 1976). 
Scholars have noted that managers may further strengthen their position by adopting 
takeover defenses (Kabir, Cantrijn and Jeunink, 1997; Jiraporn and Chintrakarn, 
2009), smoothing a firm’s income streams and colluding with non-shareholder 
stakeholders (Surroca and Tribo, 2008). While the performance implications of 
managerial entrenchment are topic of debate, a growing body of literature shows that 
it often comes at the expense of the shareholders (cf. Florackis and Ozkan, 2009; 
Sundaramurthy, 2000; Surroca and Tribo, 2008). 
 
Managerial ownership. In the Dutch context, two entrenchment mechanisms might 
be of particular importance regarding the spread of an SVO. First, scholars have noted 
that major ownership stakes by managers shields them from the market for corporate 
control (Gugler, Mueller and Yurtoglu, 2008; Surroca and Tribo, 2008), i.e., it enables 
them to act more opportunistically as the chances of repercussion are much smaller 
(De Miguel, Pindado and De La Torre, 2004). Moreover, ownership of managers may 
create a stronger bond with a firm and its stakeholders, which is often illustrated by a 
more traditionalist and long-term orientation (Fiss and Zajac, 2004; Young et al., 
2008). Therefore, we expect that managers with major ownership stakes will be less 
inclined to sense and respond to pressures for shareholder value. This suggests the 
following hypotheses:  
 
Hypothesis 3a (H3a): The relationship specified in H1, i.e., that higher 
technical misfit among major owners reduces the likelihood of adopting an 
SVO, will be further amplified when a firm’s top managers hold larger equity 
stakes.  
  
Hypothesis 3b (H3b): The relationship specified in H2, i.e., that higher cultural 
misfit among major owners reduces the likelihood of adopting an SVO, will be 
further amplified when a firm’s top managers hold larger equity stakes. 
   
Anti-investor protection. Managers in stakeholder oriented contexts might also 
alleviate capital market pressures via anti-investor protection measures (De Jong et 
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al., 2005; Surroca and Tribo, 2008). Two widely applied devices in the Netherlands 
are preference shares and tradable depository receipts. While scholars have illustrated 
that anti-investor protection measures generally have a negative effect on a 
corporation’s performance in the Dutch setting (Chirinko et al., 2004; De Jong et al., 
2005), Groot (1998) also showed that managers experience less short-term pressures 
when shielded by tradable depository receipts. Taken this into consideration, we 
expect that anti-investor protection devices will lessen a company’s inclination to 
respond to claims, made by technical and cultural outsiders, in favor of the espousal 
of an SVO. This suggests the following hypotheses: 
 
Hypothesis 3c (H3c): The relationship specified in H1, i.e., that higher 
technical misfit among major owners reduces the likelihood of adopting an 
SVO, will be further amplified when the firm has anti-investor protection 
measures.  
 
Hypothesis 3d (H3d): The relationship specified in H2, i.e., that higher cultural 
misfit among major owners reduces the likelihood of adopting an SVO, will be 
further amplified when the firm has anti-investor protection measures. 
  
Macro Level Political Resistance 
Given that human action takes place in a broader, ongoing system of social 
relationships (Granovetter, 1985), a firm’s (non)response to international pressures for 
shareholder value is also determined by a company’s embeddedness in the domestic 
context, i.e., the extent to which a firm is infused with national values, norms and 
beliefs. Scholars have noted that the extent to which firms derive their identity from 
their national context differs (Oliver, 1991; Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978) and that, as a 
result, the risks and costs related with nonconformance to taken for granted national 
values, norms and beliefs vary. Moreover, the more that a firm’s identity originates 
from a national context, the less likely will it be that a firm observes alternative 
models and logics, and will have a motive to pursue change (Greenwood and 
Suddaby, 2006). With regard to the (non)adoption of an SVO, two mechanisms may 
be particularly powerful in reinforcing national identities. 
 
National media attention. Gamson et al. (1992:374) argue that “media messages can 
act as teachers of values, ideologies, and beliefs and that they can provide images for 
interpreting the world”. As such they have a significant imprint on the ways in which 
both companies and stakeholders construct social reality and act upon it (Deephouse, 
 
 
 15
2000; Hoynes and Croteau, 2005). As a result, firms that are highly visible in the 
domestic media might be more hesitant to refer to contested beliefs in response to 
pressure from technical and cultural outsiders, as they are more closely monitored by 
a variety of stakeholders and might be afraid of reputation losses. Accordingly, Fiss 
and Zajac (2006) illustrate that more visible corporations often weaken their espousal 
of an SVO by also highlighting the interests of other stakeholders. Taken this into 
consideration, we expect that a firm’s media exposure will lessen the influence of 
outsiders on the value orientation of a corporation. More formally, this suggests the 
following hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 4a (H4a): The relationship specified in H1, i.e., that higher 
technical misfit among major owners reduces the likelihood of adopting an 
SVO, will be further amplified when the firm has greater national media 
exposure. 
 
Hypothesis 4b (H4b): The relationship specified in H2, i.e., that higher cultural 
misfit among major owners reduces the likelihood of adopting an SVO, will be 
further amplified when the firm has greater national media exposure.  
 
Domestic board network centrality. While a large body of research has shown that 
board networks contribute to the diffusion of practices (Davis, 1991; Haunschild, 
1993; Sanders and Tüschke, 2007), others have highlighted that these networks create 
and shape social identities (Ibarra, Kilduff and Tsai, 2005). Through interaction with 
other directors, norms, values and beliefs are conferred that influence the images 
directors have of themselves, and their corporation and its environment. In this regard, 
Westphal and Khanna (2003) illustrated that directors convey norms and values 
regarding appropriate board behavior through board ties, and reinforce them through 
punishing non-conforming directors. Particularly, the more central organizations and 
actors may be involved in this process, as they are more aware of the prevailing logics 
and have a larger interest in maintaining the status quo (Greenwood and Suddaby, 
2006). Taken this into account, we expect that more central firms, in a board network 
in which norms and values associated with the stakeholder model predominate, will 
have stronger incentives to oppose technical and cultural pressures for change. This 
suggests the following hypotheses: 
 
Hypothesis 4c (H4c): The relationship specified in H1, i.e., that higher 
technical misfit among major owners reduces the likelihood of adopting an 
SVO, will be fur-ther amplified when the firm has greater centrality in the 
domestic board network. 
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Hypothesis 4d (H4d): The relationship specified in H2, i.e., that higher cultural 
misfit among major owners reduces the likelihood of adopting an SVO, will be 
fur-ther amplified when the firm has greater centrality in the domestic board 
network.  
 
Performance Implications 
While the introduction of the Anglo-American shareholder model in stakeholder 
oriented contexts has been criticized extensively (Froud et al., 2000; Mintzberg, 2000; 
Raynor, 2008), the empirical evidence regarding the performance implications is 
sparse and rather mixed. On the one hand, scholars have highlighted that the espousal 
of an SVO is associated with disturbed labor and industrial relationships, 
underinvestment and a short-term (vs. long-term) optimization of a firm’s 
performance (Ghoshal, 2005; Lane, 2003). On the other hand, some suggest that 
espousing an SVO will have a positive impact on a firm’s financial performance, 
because “associations around value creation are powerful, because they suggest 
focused, effective management, delivering improved performance in the interests of 
shareholders” (Froud et al., 2000:85). By referring to shareholder value, listed firms 
may signal their commitment to the interests of shareholders and, as such, enhance 
their legitimacy in international capital markets. Moreover, espousing companies may 
be more focused on the financial bottom line as they might be more sensitive to the 
preferences and wishes of shareholders, being the actors that have the strongest 
incentives to maximize total firm value as residual claimants (Sundaram and Inkpen, 
2004).  
 While disagreement in both the academic and business literatures as to the 
positive versus negative performance implications of adopting an SVO is likely to 
continue, we remain agnostic on this “main effect” question, and suggest instead that 
there is value in moving toward the more nuanced question of what particular 
antecedent circumstances favor or disfavor a positive SVO adoption/firm performance 
relationship.2 In particular, our socio-political framework suggests that one such 
important contingency is the (mis)alignment of corporate elites. More specifically, our 
earlier hypotheses (H1 and H2) posited that the greater the cultural and technical 
misfit between major owners and the pursuit of an SVO, the lower the likelihood of a 
firm’s adopting such an SVO. We can logically extend our argument to analyze how 
                                                 
2 Indeed, some scholars have reported that stakeholder and shareholder oriented firms perform 
comparably well (Omran, Atrill and Pointon, 2002), and that companies espousing a hybrid version of 
an SVO may generate more positive shareholder returns (Fiss and Zajac, 2006). 
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such antecedent misalignment will affect the subsequent performance of firms that do 
adopt an SVO. Specifically, for that subset of firms engaging in SVO with their major 
owners unprepared (either technically or culturally) to support such a change, we 
expect that such misfitted change will exert a downward pressure on firm 
performance. The lack of unity in the pursuit of corporate objectives can lead 
companies to be stuck in the middle, with the presence of multiple goals and 
expectations leading to confusion, friction and indecisive decision-making (Jensen, 
2001; Sundaram and Inkpen, 2004). The likely presence of such contestation suggests 
the following moderator hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 5a (H5a): The relationship between a firm’s espousal of an SVO 
and subsequent financial performance is made worse by a lack of technical fit 
between major owners and the SVO. 
 
Hypothesis 5b (H5b): The relationship between a firm’s espousal of an SVO 
and subsequent financial performance is made worse by a lack of cultural fit 
between major owners and the SVO. 
 
While the prior hypotheses flow logically from the discussion of how misaligned 
power-ful owners can create direct conflict detrimental to firm performance after SVO 
adoption, there are also more subtle forms of misalignment that can have a similar 
deleterious effect on financial performance. Specifically, we suggest that evidence of 
little or no implementation of an SVO is a signal of management’s 
unwillingness/inability to act on the intentions of those owners seeking an SVO. The 
shareholder value model has often been associated with practices such as stock option 
compensation schemes, buy-back programs, value-based management tools and 
internationally accepted accounting standards (Fiss and Zajac, 2004; Froud et al., 
2000; Lazonick and O’Sullivan, 2000). Although the performance implications of 
these practices are also topic of debate in stakeholder-oriented contexts (Fiss and 
Zajac, 2006; Tüschke and Sanders, 2003), their implementation may signal to the 
global capital markets that a company’s directors are dedicated to put their money 
where their mouth is, thereby publicly displaying their inclination to serve 
shareholders’ interests and confirming their efforts to align their own goals with those 
of shareholders3. Accordingly, we expect that corporations that both espouse and 
                                                 
3 We acknowledge the growing body of literature that has shown that the symbolic adoption of 
practices (i.e., seemingly adopting practices but not implementing them) might already generate 
abnormal returns (Westphal and Zajac, 1994; 1998; Zajac and Westphal, 2004).  Our argument simply 
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implement an SVO will obtain higher performance returns than companies only 
referring to it. More formally, this suggests the following hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 5c (H5c): The relationship between a firm’s espousal of an SVO 
and subsequent financial performance is made worse by a lack of 
implementation of practices associated with an SVO.  
  
METHODS 
The empirical research focuses on the top-100 listed corporations at the Euronext 
Stock Exchange in Amsterdam during the period 1992-2006. The top-100 listed 
companies were selected based on their average market capitalization and sales. 
Given new entrants, mergers and acquisitions, bankruptcies and delistings, 201 
companies made it to either one of the lists during the observation window. Of these, 
17 firms were excluded as their annual reports were unavailable. Overall, this resulted 
in an unbalanced panel of 184 listed firms for which a total of 1414 complete firm-
year observations were available during the period 1992-2006. Together, these 
corporations represent seven industries (construction, manufacturing, transport and 
communication, wholesale, retail, financial services, and other services) and 
constituted the backbone of the Dutch economy during this period. While several 
companies already espoused an SVO in 1992, the availability of annual reports and 
data on their ownership structure restricted us from further going back in time and 
capturing the dynamics during the initial phase. 
 
Dependent Variables 
In this study, we use two dependent variables: the espousal of a shareholder value 
orientation and a firm’s financial performance. Following prior research (Fiss and 
Zajac, 2004; 2006), data on the espousal of an SVO were collected through a content 
analysis of companies’ annual reports , still one of the major corporate tools in use to 
communicate with shareholders in the Dutch context. As such, the language used 
inside these reports regarding shareholder value will be an important reflection of 
managerial predispositions towards this “normative governance paradigm” (Fiss and 
Zajac, 2004:512; Pye, 2002) and of the way in which a company publicly presents 
itself to the capital markets. Two independent raters, both native speakers, coded the 
available 1414 annual reports by searching for the terms “shareholder value” and its 
                                                                                                                                            
adds the notion that the actual implementation of practices signals unity of ownership and management 
and should further improve a company’s performance. 
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Dutch equivalent (“aandeelhouders-waarde”). There appeared to be a high overlap in 
the ratings of the coders: the percent agreement (96.2%) and Cohen’s Kappa (0.924) 
were both above the acceptance threshold (Dewey, 1983). Table 1 provides 
illustrative examples of statements indicating espousal in the Dutch context. 
---- Insert Table 1 about here ---- 
 
 To investigate the performance implications of the espousal of an SVO, we 
use two widely used performance indicators: return on assets (ROA) and total 
shareholder return (TSR). ROA is one of the most often used accounting-based 
measures of performance that provides insight in the shorter term, historical 
profitability of a company (Anderson, Fornell and Mazvancheryl, 2004; Thomsen and 
Pedersen, 2000). TSR is one of the most often used market-based measures of 
performance that also incorporates the long-term profitability expectations (Anderson, 
Fornell and Mazvancheryl, 2004; Fiss and Zajac, 2006). The financial data were 
collected via the databases Thomson One Banker Worldscope and Reach. As ROA 
and TSR might be influenced by the industry in which a firm operates (Tüschke and 
Sanders, 2003), we also calculated the industry-adjusted ROAs and TSRs. As we 
obtained similar results, we only report the unadjusted measures. 
 
Independent variables Data on ownership by cultural and technical outsiders and 
insiders were collected via “Handboek Nederlandse Beursfondsen”, an annual 
publication that provides an overview of the major owners of Dutch listed companies. 
According to the Dutch “Law on the Disclosure of Shareholdings”, these firms are 
legally obliged to disclose ownership stakes above 5% to the AFM, the regulator of 
Dutch financial markets. Ownership by cultural outsiders was calculated by summing 
up the blockholdings by major owners from contexts in which the shareholder value 
model is generally accepted, e.g., the United States and the United Kingdom (Groot, 
1998; Lazonick and O’Sullivan, 2000). Ownership by cultural insiders was calculated 
by summing up the blockholdings by major owners from Continental European 
countries, i.e., shareholders that have the strongest association with the Dutch 
stakeholder model. Subsequently, ownership by technical outsiders was calculated by 
summing up the major blockholdings by financial institutions (e.g., hedge funds, 
private equity firms and investment funds), owners are used to apply the economic 
logic associated with the shareholder value model (Fiss and Zajac, 2004; Lazonick 
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and O’Sullivan, 2000). Banks were omitted from this category as these firms may be 
hesitant to support initiatives that put more emphasis on short-term profits, as this 
might jeopardize their other financial interests. Ownership by technological insiders 
was determined by summing up the major blockholdings by non-financial 
corporations and family ownership, i.e., owners that can identify themselves, for a 
variety of reasons, with a firm’s business. As the concept of power is core to our 
arguments and the rights of major owners increase when certain ownership thresholds 
are reached, we use the same ordinal measure as Fiss and Zajac (2004; 2006): 0 if that 
category owned less than 5.0%, 1 if that category owned more than 5.0% but less than 
25.0%, 2 if that category owned more than 25.0% but less than 50.0%, 3 if that 
category owned more than 50.0% but less than 75.0%, and 4 if that category owned 
more than 75.0%. Finally, we subtracted the scores of cultural and technical insiders 
from those of cultural and technical outsiders respectively, to obtain our scores for 
cultural and technical fit. 
 
Moderating variables. In this study, managerial entrenchment by a firm’s directors 
was measured by two indicators. First, scholars have noted that ownership by 
directors shields them from the market for corporate control (Gugler, Mueller and 
Yurtoglu, 2008; Surroca and Tribo, 2008). Data on managerial ownership were 
obtained from the “Handboek Nederlandse Beursfondsen”, and complemented by data 
from annual reports. As managerial power is central to our arguments, we applied the 
same ordinal transformation as previously described. Second, scholars have noted that 
anti-investor protection devices alleviate pressures from the market for corporate 
control (De Jong et al., 2005; Surroca and Tribo, 2008). We created a dummy variable 
for the presence of either preference shares and/or tradable depository receipts, two 
widely applied devices in the Dutch context.  
 A firm’s embeddedness in the national context was measured by two 
indicators. First, following Fiss and Zajac (2006), media attention was measured by a 
count variable of the number of Dutch newspaper articles containing the name of a 
particular company. Data were collected from the four largest daily newspapers in the 
Netherlands: “De Volkskrant”, “Het Algemeen Dagblad”, “Het NRC Handelsblad” en 
“De Telegraaf”. Together these newspapers embody the whole socio-political variety 
of the Dutch context, ranging from relatively left-winged (“De Volkskrant”) to 
relatively right-winged (“De Telegraaf”) socio-political stances. All data were 
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obtained via de database LexisNexis and databases of public libraries, and our search 
yielded more than 350,000 hits during our observation window. We conducted a 
principal component analysis and all four newspapers positively loaded on a single 
factor which explained 88% of the variance (Cronbachs’ α = .86). As the resulting 
count variable for media attention turned out to be heavily skewed, we used its natural 
logarithm in our analyses. Second, domestic board network centrality was calculated 
by counting the number of direct board ties with other Dutch listed firms, a measure 
that is often used as an indicator of power (Mariolis and Jones, 1982; Wasserman and 
Faust, 1994). The data were obtained from the “Handboek Nederlandse 
Beursfondsen” and the “Spencer Stuart Netherlands Board Indexes” that contain 
information on directors who occupied positions on boards and TMTs in the 
Netherlands during the period 1992-2006. As this distribution was skewed, we used 
its logarithm in our analyses. 
  Finally, the implementation of an SVO was measured by a formative scale of 
four practices that have often been associated with such a logic: share buy-back 
programs, stock option compensation schemes, value-based management tools and 
internationally accepted accounting standards (Fiss and Zajac, 2004; Froud et al., 
2000; Lazonick and O’Sullivan, 2000). All practices either align the interests of 
managers and shareholders or provide benefits to shareholders such as more 
transparency or a stronger focus on economic value. All data were collected through a 
content analysis of the annual reports. Two other independent raters, both native 
speakers, coded the available 1414 annual reports by searching for terms related to 
these four practices. There appeared to be enough overlap in the ratings of the two 
coders: the percent agreement varied between 85.6% and 96.3%, and the Cohen’s 
Kappa’s ranged from 0.712 to 0.925 for the varying practices. 
 
Control variables. By including various additional variables, we controlled for 
possible confounding effects. As scholars have suggested that the diffusion of the 
shareholder value model is driven by capital- and product-market pressures (Lazonick 
and O’Sullivan, 2000), we included a firm’s debt-to-equity ratio, using the amount of 
equity raised externally (Fiss and Zajac, 2004). Furthermore, we included the ratio of 
foreign-sales to total sales to control for international product-market pressures, i.e., 
by operating abroad firms may become more sensitive to alternate corporate 
governance models and/or more acquainted with the merits of these models (Sanders 
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and Tüschke, 2007). Finally, as the espousal of an SVO might also depend on the 
dynamics of the market for corporate control, we included the percentage of dispersed 
shares to control for the disciplining role this market might fulfill (Fiss and Zajac, 
2004). 
 Scholars have also noted that prior experience with contested practices 
increases the likelihood that a firm will adopt another contested practice (Sanders and 
Tüschke, 2007; Zajac and Westphal, 2004). Related, the referral to the shareholder 
value model may, in fact, be part of an emergent strategy, i.e., a company’s post-hoc 
rationalization of the implementation of practices that are associated with an SVO 
(i.e., stock option schemes, share buy-back programs, value-based management tools 
and internationally accepted accounting standards). To control for this possible effect, 
we included a count variable capturing a firm’s prior experience with these practices. 
 Finally, we added several firm level controls. First, as larger companies might 
be less dependent on the financial markets and, as a result, perceive less short-term 
pressures (Groot, 1998), we included the natural logarithm of the total sales during a 
year. Second, poorly performing companies might be more inclined to espouse an 
SVO to restore their public reputation. Therefore, we added a lagged measure of TSR 
and ROA to our models. Third, prior studies have shown that older corporations may 
have higher cumulative experience enhancing change; however, they might also 
encounter problems in keeping abreast with new developments (Sorensen and Stuart 
2000). We included firm age which was operationalized as the number of years 
passed after founding to control for these age effects. Fourth, while Dutch listed 
companies usually operate a two-tier board, several of them have adopted the one-tier 
board, i.e., a structure that is more common around the globe. As these firms may be 
more responsive to international developments, we included a dummy variable 
capturing the (non)presence of a two-tier board. Fifth, to account for industry-specific 
and time-specific effects, we included dummy variables for the company’s two-digit 
BIK code (i.e., the Dutch equivalent of the SIC codes) and for the years of our 
observation window, in all our models. Given the large number of variables, the 
industry-specific and time-specific effects are not reported in the tables. 
 
Analysis 
To examine the antecedents of company’s espousal of an SVO, we employed random-
effects logistic regression models, as our dependent variable is a dummy capturing a 
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firm’s (non)espousal (Maddala, 2005). A Hausman test indicated that the random-
effects model is the appropriate choice to analyze our data (χ2 = 17.99; df = 18; p > 
0.05). Furthermore, to examine the performance implications of the espousal of an 
SVO, we ran several random-effects pooled time series regression models for ROA. A 
Hausman test showed that the random-effects model is the appropriate way to 
examine our data (χ2 = 31.17; df = 27; p > 0.05). To investigate the impact on a firm’s 
TSR, we conducted several fixed-effects pooled time series regression models. A 
Hausman test indicated that this model was most appropriate (χ2 = 78.09; df = 27; p < 
0.05). Finally, all the independent and control variables were one year lagged in our 
analyses. 
 
RESULTS 
Using explicit statements referring to an SVO in annual reports of the top-100 listed 
corporations in the Netherlands, Figure 1 illustrates the extent to which these firms 
have espoused this orientation during the period 1992-2006. As depicted, a gradual 
and significant increase is visible, revealing the advance of this alternative orientation 
in a traditionally stakeholder oriented context: while 13% of the top-100 listed firms 
referred to the shareholder value model in 1992, 74% of them did in 2006. 
 
---- Insert Figure 1 about here ---- 
 
Table 2 provides an overview of the descriptive statistics of our panel of 184 listed 
firms in the Netherlands during the period 1992-2006. Table 3 reports the random 
effects logistic models predicting the espousal of an SVO among listed firms in the 
Netherlands. The results generally support our notion that the diffusion of an SVO can 
be understood as driven by the level of technical and cultural (mis)fit between the 
values of the corporate elites and that of the practice itself. In accordance with H1, our 
empirical results indicate that a lack of technical fit (i.e., predominance of non-
financial corporations and families as major owners), decreases the likelihood that a 
firm will espouse an SVO. Moreover, in accordance with H2, our findings also 
highlight that the predominance of major owners that can culturally associate 
themselves with the stakeholder model (i.e., Continental European investors), 
negatively influences a firm’s inclination to adopt an SVO. Taken together, these 
 
 
 24
findings suggest that the diffusion of the shareholder value model is both a cultural 
and a technical phenomenon in the Dutch context.  
 Furthermore, we find mixed support for the notion that macro and micro 
political resistance affect the technical and cultural factors that generate 
(mis)alignment among the corporate elite. Regarding the moderator effect of the 
political context on technical fit, our results indicate that, as predicted, greater national 
media exposure amplified the negative relationship between technical misfit among 
owners and SVO adoption (H4a). However, managerial ownership (H3a), board 
protection devices (H3c) and a company’s centrality in the domestic board network 
(H4c) did not affect this relationship. Regarding the effect of the political context on 
cultural fit, our results highlight that the negative relationship between cultural misfit 
and espousal of an SVO is also positively moderated by a company’s exposure to the 
national media (H4b). This is also true firms with higher levels of managerial 
ownership (H3b). We did not find any significant influence of board protection 
devices (H3d) and a firm’s centrality in the domestic board network (H4d) on this 
relationship. In sum, these results highlight the potential for macro and micro political 
sources of resistance that can inhibit contested change. 
 Regarding the control variables, prior experience with practices associated 
with an SVO positively influences the likelihood that a firm refers to this logic. This 
suggests that for listed companies in the Netherlands, in contrast to a body of research 
on symbolic management (cf. Fiss and Zajac, 2004; Westphal and Zajac, 1994; 1998), 
espousal may actually be part of an emergent strategy. By explicitly linking their 
already-implemented practices with their subsequent rhetoric when communicating 
with financial markets, Dutch listed firms may attempt to appear more attractive as 
investment opportunities.  
 
 ---- Insert Tables 2 and 3 about here ---- 
 
Table 4 provides our results for the random effects regressions predicting the 
accounting performance implications of the espousal of an SVO. Recall that while we 
did not make a main-effect hypothesis for the consequences of SVO adoption, it is of 
course noteworthy that Table 4 shows that the main effect is in fact negative, 
suggesting that espousing an SVO is not beneficial to a corporation in a stakeholder 
oriented context. Furthermore, we find mixed support for the notion that misfitted 
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change, i.e., engaging in SVO with major owners unprepared) will exert a downward 
pressure on firm performance. As predicted in H5a, the relationship between SVO 
adoption and subsequent firm performance is made worse by a lack of technical fit 
between major owners and the SVO. In contrast, we do not find any evidence that 
cultural misfit similarly affects this relationship (H5b). Finally, as predicted in H5c, 
the negative relationship between a firm’s SVO espousal and ROA is amplified by 
lack of implementation of practices associated with the new SVO logic. In conclusion, 
our findings suggest that a firm’s adoption of an SVO will create downward pressure 
on a company’s accounting performance in a stakeholder oriented context. This 
relationship is intensified by two sources of elite misalignment: technical misfit 
among major owners and the SVO, and a lack of implementation of SVO practices.  
 Table 5 reports our findings for the fixed effects regressions predicting the 
market performance implications of the espousal of an SVO. Interestingly, none of the 
relationships between a firm’s espousal and TSR is supported, suggesting that the 
stock market has been rather skeptical and unresponsive to the espousal and 
implementation of an SVO in the Dutch context during the period 1992-2006.4 
 
---- Insert Tables 4 and 5 about here ---- 
 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
We began by suggesting that analyses of the diffusion of a contested organizational 
practice/idea could benefit from a contingent, socio-political framework that gave 
prominence to identifying the possible technical and cultural misalignment of 
organiza-tional elites, along with a more explicit consideration of micro/macro 
political moderators of such misalignment. We developed and tested such a 
framework in the context of the recent diffusion of an SVO among listed companies 
in the Netherlands. 
 Our theoretical and empirical analyses addressed explicitly the antecedents 
and the consequences of contested organizational change. Regarding the question of 
antecedents, while scholars have debated whether change is driven by the economic 
and technical benefits offered by new practices or by social factors, i.e., “the way 
things are” and “the way things are to be done” (Scott, 1987:496), our study 
                                                 
4 As a robustness check, we also ran two-stage Heckman models for our firm performance analyses (to 
address the possibility of sample selection bias), which yielded results similar to those described above.   
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highlights the influence of both the technical and the cultural contexts in which firms 
reside. Specifically, our socio-political perspective, with its emphasis on elite 
(mis)alignment as a source of contestation, advanced and found support for the notion 
that the balance of ownership power between organizational elites explains the 
diffusion of contested beliefs in the Netherlands, and further, that this contestation 
was occurring between technical and cultural “outsiders for change” and “insiders for 
the status quo.” Moreover, our empirical results indicate that additional political 
factors, both macro (e.g., media exposure) and micro (e.g., managerial entrenchment), 
also played a significant role in the contestation of the diffusing new organizational 
change. Thus, our study highlights that the technical, cultural and political dimensions 
of a firm’s context are intertwined and jointly shape a company’s response to 
pressures to adopt contested beliefs, such as the Anglo-American shareholder value 
model (Ansari, Fiss and Zajac, 2010). In this way, we bridge and reconcile prior 
studies that have examined the diffusion of the shareholder value model either as a 
phenomenon driven by capital- and product-market pressures (cf. Lazonick and 
O’Sullivan, 2000) or by social and institutional processes (Fiss and Zajac, 2004; 2006; 
Sanders and Tüschke, 2007). 
 Regarding the performance consequences of a firm’s adoption of SVO, we 
noted that debates are often highly spirited while firm-level analyses are very sparse, 
and that our contingency socio-political framework sought to address both issues by 
linking the expected performance consequences to the firm’s antecedent levels of elite 
misalignment. We find support for our notion that SVO adoption has a particularly 
negative effect on subsequent firm performance when SVO adoption occurs with 
misaligned elites, which we termed misfitted change. We also find evidence that the 
performance detriment attributable to the misfitted change, i.e., the technical 
misalignment of organizational elites, can be at least partially attenuated through the 
use of senior management incentive plans that align top managers with outside 
owners pushing for change. We also found that the negative SVO adoption-firm 
performance relationship was additionally attenuated by the implementation of 
substantive practices associated with the shareholder value model. 
While we were agnostic as to the overall main-effect relationship between 
SVO adoption and subsequent firm performance, it is noteworthy that the main-effect 
results support criticism that the adoption of this contested practice/idea hampers 
subsequent firm performance (Mintzberg, 2000; Raynor, 2008): espousing companies 
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experienced significantly poorer accounting performance results than non-espousing 
firms. Taken together, these empirical findings suggest that most listed firms in the 
Netherlands have been unable to derive the presumed benefits of adopting an SVO. 
While this may simply support prior studies that have noted that beliefs and practices 
can still diffuse when they are technically inefficient (Yoshikawa and Rasheed, 2009), 
it may also suggest that additional contextual factors discriminate between those few 
listed corporations that actually benefit from contested change versus the many that 
do not. Future research could assess this notion by examining to which extent the 
timing of adoption (Tüschke and Sanders, 2003; Zajac and Westphal, 2004) and the 
tailoring of practices to the national context (Ansari, Fiss and Zajac, 2010; Yoshikawa 
and Rasheed, 2009) affect a firm’s subsequent financial performance.  
 Finally, we find our socio-political perspective useful in uncovering and 
explaining important differences with prior research on the adoption of contested 
practices/ideas such as an SVO. For example, our study highlights that the diffusion 
of the shareholder value model has been stimulated from without in the Dutch 
context, whereas Fiss and Zajac (2004) illustrate that major domestic owners for 
change initiated change in the German context. Since both countries are exemplars of 
the Rhineland stakeholder model and use two-tier boards, the witnessed differences 
are quite striking. Future multi-country studies could examine these differences more 
structurally, and compare and contrast the processes through which beliefs diffuse in 
various technical, political and cultural contexts (Aguilera et al., 2008; Hambrick, 
Von Werder and Zajac, 2008; Yoshikawa and Rasheed, 2009). 
 
Managerial and Policy Implications 
While our main intended contributions are research-focused, we also see our 
empirical findings have at least three important implications for practitioners and 
policy makers. First, our results highlight that beliefs regarding shareholder value 
have strongly affected (for better or worse) the practices of listed firms in the 
Netherlands, i.e., while 13% of the top-100 listed firms referred to shareholder value 
in 1992, 74% espoused an SVO in 2006. While scholars have argued that the 
movement towards the shareholder value model should not be overstated (Morris, 
Hassard and McCann, 2008) and that symbolism plays an important role as firms may 
decouple espousal from implementation (Fiss and Zajac, 2004), our empirical results 
highlight that the adoption and the implementation of SVO has been significant, 
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symbolically and substantively. As such, this deep compliance suggests that espousal 
may actually be part of an emergent strategy of listed firms, i.e., that they for strategic 
purposes decide to integrate already implemented practices in their rhetoric while 
communicating with financial markets. The depth and breadth of adoption and 
implementation also makes the negative performance findings particularly noteworthy. 
Second, the study highlights that there is no “natural” governance model for 
large Dutch firms, but rather that the corporate governance model that secures local 
hegemony will be defined in terms of the technical, political and cultural situations in 
which listed firms reside (Ansari, Fiss and Zajac, 2010; Rosenberg, 2005:177). Our 
socio-political perspective showed clearly how the aligned versus misaligned 
technical and cultural preferences of major owners, along with other macro/micro 
political factors, affects a firm’s (non)openness to contested corporate governance 
beliefs. While companies might only have a limited amount of influence on these 
factors, listed companies can partially determine their own direction by attracting 
certain types of major owners, rewarding directors by means of stock options and 
stimulating domestic media exposure. Moreover, we have highlighted that the 
technical, cultural and political dimensions of a company’s context are intertwined 
and jointly affect the leeway that directors have in influencing a firm’s direction. This 
suggests that optimizing a firm’s positioning and choices along all three dimensions is 
essential in the wake of the spread of new contested beliefs. 
 Third, while scholars have argued that the role of contextual factors is rather 
ill-understood in corporate governance research (e.g., Aguilera et al., 2008; Hambrick, 
Von Werder and Zajac, 2008), our study highlights the importance of these factors 
regarding the diffusion of contested beliefs. They do not only seem to affect a 
company’s espousal of an SVO, but also the performance consequences. Our results 
suggest that when a corporation adopts an SVO in the presence of misaligned elites, 
performance will be negatively affected. Basically, this implies that directors should 
be very careful in transferring and applying new corporate governance beliefs in other 
contexts without critically analyzing their institutional fitness. Furthermore, foreigner 
investors should be aware of these context specificities while operating in an 
alternative institutional setting. 
 
Limitations and Avenues for Future Research 
The study has several limitations that also provide avenues for future research. First, 
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we investigated why companies did or did not espouse an SVO, consistent with other 
research that views adoption as essentially dichotomous. However, very recent 
research has suggested that processes associated with the adoption of (contested) 
corporate governance beliefs may also be more subtle (cf. Ansari, Fiss and Zajac, 
2010). Studies have suggested that firms may actually adopt “hybrid models” in 
which new beliefs are adapted and tailored to the specifics of a company’s context 
(Guillen, 2001; Yoshikawa, Tsui-Auch and McGuire, 2007; Yoshikawa and Rasheed, 
2009). There may be additional nuances in the rhetoric that listed firms use while 
espousing an SVO in a stakeholder context that we did not capture (Fiss and Zajac, 
2006). Future research could investigate these more subtle diffusion processes and 
examine how these processes vary over time. In terms of methodology, it would also 
be interesting to apply more fine-grained tools to analyze a company’s discourse, and 
examine boardroom discussions when a company’s response to contested change is 
being socially constructed.  
 Second, while our decision to investigate the diffusion of an SVO in the 
Netherlands contributes to our understanding of communalities and differences 
between institutional contexts, it also constrains the generalizability of our findings. 
The Dutch context has several particularities, i.e., the two-tier board model, focus on 
collective bargaining and a strong international orientation, that may have affected the 
observed diffusion pattern. In fact, the espousal of an SVO might simply be a 
corporate strategy to satisfy Anglo-American investors and financial institutions as 
two important groups of stakeholders. Future studies could examine to which extent 
firms balance their rhetoric by referring to other groups of stakeholders (Fiss and 
Zajac, 2006) and/or their activities by implementing stakeholder oriented practices 
(e.g., non-financial performance targets tied to executive remuneration and CSR 
reports) (Harrison, Bosse and Phillips, 2010).  
We do believe that our analysis of the contested SVO diffusion process in the 
Netherlands has benefited considerably from our contingent socio-political framework 
that emphasizes the sources and consequences of such contestation. In particular, we 
found it valuable to have introduced the notion that contestation can be identified, 
measured, and related specifically to the technical and cultural misalignment of key 
elites, and that such misalignment is furthered by political conditions, and finally that 
this misalignment, if not considered, can result in SVO adoption with detrimental 
performance implications. Taken together, this suggests that directors should be 
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careful in transferring and applying new corporate governance beliefs in other 
contexts without critically analyzing their institutional fitness (cf. Ansari, Fiss and 
Zajac, 2010).  
 To conclude, it may be interesting to examine whether the observed 
development in the Netherlands is part of a two-way convergence of governance 
models, i.e., to examine whether Anglo-American oriented firms have also started to 
incorporate elements of the stakeholder model in response to the internationalization 
of their shareholder base and the global financial crisis. Preliminary evidence suggests 
that Anglo-American oriented countries are indeed slowly moving in the direction of 
the stakeholder model (cf. Yoshikawa and Rasheed, 2009). As the diffusion of 
corporate governance models is an ongoing process, the future will show to which 
extent national differences will persist and to which extent governance models will 
converge. We believe that our socio-political perspective on diffusion, with its 
emphasis on elite misalignment and the joint impact of technical, cultural and political 
factors, can provide needed insights into understanding where and when contested 
corporate governance change is more likely to take root, and whether the performance 
effect of such changes, in terms of both the involved firms and the societies in which 
they are situated, will be positive versus negative. 
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Table 1: Examples of Espousal of a Shareholder Value Orientation
 
Wessanen (1999:1): “Our key objective is to increase shareholder value”.  
 
KLM (2001:5): “Its goal is to be the first-choice passenger and cargo airline and 
provider of maintenance services while consistently enhancing shareholder value, 
providing a stimulating and dynamic working environment and participating in mutually 
beneficial relationships with its partners”.  
 
AEGON (2006:47): “Going forward, we will continue to identify opportunities in 
emerging markets that offer growth potential consistent with AEGON’s requirements of 
long-term profitability and the creation of shareholder value”. 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Espousal of a Shareholder Value Orientation among Dutch Firms (1992-
2006) 
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Table 2: Correlations and Descriptive Statistics  
a n = 1414. All correlations above |.05| are significant at p < .05. 
 Mean St. dev (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) 
(1)  Espousal of a SV orientation 
(2)  Technical Fit 
(3)  Cultural Fit 
(4) National Media Attention 
(5) National Network Centrality 
(6) TMT/Board Ownership 
(7) Board Protection Devices 
(8) Debt/ Ext. market capitalization 
(9)  Foreign sales/total sales 
(10)  Dispersed shares (%) 
(11) Prior implementation 
(12) Log sales 
(13) Leadership structure 
(14) Return on assets 
(15) Total return 
(16) Firm age 
.50 
.23 
-1.47 
3.58 
1.65 
.31 
.49 
275.30 
50.14 
61.83 
1.60 
6.93 
.95 
6.80 
18.15 
72.48 
.01 
.04 
.03 
.04 
.02 
.02 
.01 
57.40 
.81 
.69 
.03 
.05 
.05*10-1
.41 
1.18 
2.54 
 
.14 
.22 
.25 
.18 
-.08 
.09 
-.01 
.16 
.14 
.44 
.26 
-.08 
-.04 
.02 
.08 
 
 
.27 
-.03 
.09 
-.26 
.26 
-.08 
.08 
.24 
.13 
-.03 
.07 
-.05 
.02 
.03 
 
 
 
.21 
.12 
-.33 
.06 
.02 
.16 
.68 
.31 
.16 
-.04 
-.07 
.01 
.06 
 
 
 
 
.52 
-.12 
-.05 
.05 
.18 
.28 
.41 
.70 
-.20 
-.02 
-.02 
.05 
 
 
 
 
 
-.19 
.06 
-.03 
.20 
.25 
.24 
.61 
-.02*10-1
.04 
-.05 
.13 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-.09 
.01 
-.10 
-.36 
-.12 
-.22 
-.05 
.05 
.03*10-1 
-.09 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-.03 
.04 
-.02 
.03 
.03 
.16 
-.01 
-.04 
-.01 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
.02 
-.13 
.01 
.03 
.01 
-.10 
-.11 
-.02 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
.20 
.22 
.19 
-.05 
-.04 
-.04 
-.02*10-1
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
.24 
.27 
-.13 
-.03 
-.01 
.09 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
.44 
-.20 
-.04 
.02*10-1
.07 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-.26 
.09 
-.05 
.09 
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-.12 
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Table 3: Random Effects Logit Models Predicting Espousal of a Shareholder Value Orientation (n=1414) 
* p<.05; ** p<.01; *** p<.001. Significance test are one-tailed for directional hypothesis and two-tailed for control variables. All models also 
control for industry and year effects (dummy variables). Standard errors are in parentheses. A LR-test revealed that the difference between the 
Wald Chi-squares of the control model and the full model is statistically significant (p=.04). 
  
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Main Effects: Major Owners for Change 
Technical fit (Technical outsiders – Technical insiders) 
Cultural fit (Cultural outsiders – Cultural insiders) 
Moderators: Political Fit (macro-level) 
Technical fit * National media attention 
Technical fit * National network centrality 
Cultural fit * National media attention 
Cultural fit * National network centrality 
Moderators: Political Fit (micro level) 
Technical fit * TMT/Board Ownership 
Technical fit * Board Protection Devices 
Cultural fit * TMT/Board Ownership 
Cultural fit * Board Protection Devices 
Controls 
Debt/external market capitalization 
Foreign sales/total sales 
Percentage of shares dispersed 
TMT/Board ownership 
National network centrality (log) 
National media attention (log) 
Prior implementation of a shareholder value orientation 
Board Protection Devices 
Leadership structure 
Log of sales 
Return on assets 
Total return 
Age 
Constant 
Wald Chi-square 
D.f. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-.05*10-3
.05*10-1 
.01* 
-.03 
.31 
.03 
.60*** 
.10 
-.09 
.21 
.02*10-1 
.01*10-1 
02*10-1 
-1.94 
214.4***
33 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(.05*10-3)
(.05*10-1)
(.01) 
(.19) 
(.18) 
(.13) 
(.12) 
 (.26) 
(.87) 
(.12) 
 (.01) 
(.02*10-1)
(.02*10-1)
(2.04) 
 
.10 
.25* 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
-.06*10-3 
.05*10-1 
.03*10-1 
.02 
.30 
.03 
.58*** 
.07 
-.16 
.24* 
-.03*10-1 
.01*10-2 
.02*10-1 
-1.21 
215.3*** 
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 (.10) 
(.11) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(.05*10-3)
(.05*10-1)
(.01) 
 (.19) 
(.18) 
(.12) 
(.12) 
(.26) 
 (.87) 
(.12) 
(.01) 
 (.01*102)
(.02*10-1)
(2.07) 
 
.49* 
 
 
-.10 
.05 
 
 
 
-.20* 
-.18 
 
 
 
-.05*10-3
.04*10-1 
.01 
-.22 
.32 
.04 
.59*** 
.06 
-.04 
.21 
-.01*10-1
.01*10-2 
.02*10-1 
-1.86 
214.3***
38 
 
(.25) 
 
 
(.07) 
(.10) 
 
 
 
(.12) 
(.18) 
 
 
 
(.05*10-3)
(.05*10-1)
(.00) 
 (.23) 
(.18) 
(.13) 
 (.12) 
(.27) 
 (.87) 
(.12) 
 (.01) 
(.02*10-2)
(.02*10-1)
(2.04) 
 
 
.22* 
 
 
 
-.12* 
-.04 
 
 
 
-.34* 
.01 
 
-.06*10-3
.05*10-1 
.01*10-1 
-.36 
.29 
.07 
.58*** 
.13 
-.22 
.22 
.06*10-2 
.09*10-2 
.02*10-1 
-1.01 
218.0***
38 
 
 
(.12) 
 
  
 
(.07) 
(.10) 
 
 
 
(.15) 
(.18) 
 
(.05*10-3)
(.05*10-1)
(.01) 
 (.25) 
(.18) 
(.13) 
 (.12) 
(.26) 
 (.87) 
(.12) 
 (.01) 
(.02*10-2)
(.02*10-1)
(2.07) 
 
.51* 
.24* 
 
-.12* 
.03 
-.12* 
-.02 
 
-.16 
-.16 
-.31* 
.07 
 
-.06*10-3
.04*10-1 
-.01*10-1
-.49 
.30 
.08 
.57*** 
.09 
-.19 
.22 
.03*10-3 
.08*10-2 
.02*10-1 
-.91 
217.4***
43 
 
 (.26) 
(.12) 
 
 (.07) 
(.10) 
(.07) 
(.10) 
 
 (.12) 
(.19) 
(.16) 
(.19) 
 
(.06*10-3) 
(.05*10-1) 
(.01) 
(.28) 
(.18) 
(.13) 
(.12) 
(.27) 
(.87) 
(.12)  
(.01) 
(.02*10-1) 
(.02*10-1) 
 (2.08) 
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Table 4: Random Effects GLS Regression Models Predicting Accounting Performance (ROA) 
* p<.05; ** p<.01; *** p<.001. Significance test are one-tailed for directional hypothesis and two-tailed for control variables. All models also 
control for industry and year effects (dummy variables). Robust standard errors are in parentheses. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Main Effect:  
Espousal of a shareholder value orientation 
Moderators (substance):  
Implementation of a shareholder value orientation 
Espousal * implementation of a SV orientation. 
Moderators (fit):    
Cultural fit 
Cultural fit * espousal of SV orientation 
Technical fit 
Technical fit * espousal of a SV orientation. 
Controls: 
Debt/external market capitalization 
Foreign sales/total sales 
Percentage of shares dispersed 
National network centrality 
Log of sales 
Leadership Structure 
Total return  
Age 
Constant 
Wald Chi-square 
D.f. 
Number of Cases 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
.02*10-5 
-.06 
.03 
-.92 
-.11 
-1.20 
.03*** 
.01 
15.02 
162.5***
27 
1202 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(.02*10-2)
(.04) 
(.06) 
(.87) 
 (1.03) 
(2.27) 
 (.01) 
(.01) 
(10.49) 
 
-.89* 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
.03*10-3 
-.01 
-.03 
-.09 
-.11 
-1.64 
.03*** 
.01 
16.79* 
175.7***
28 
1202 
 
(.51) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(.01*10-2)
(.02) 
(.02) 
(.42) 
 (.68) 
(1.92) 
 (.01) 
(.01) 
(8.56) 
 
-.84** 
 
-.65 
.85* 
 
 
 
 
 
 
.05*10-3 
-.01 
-.03 
-.18 
-.02 
-1.34 
.03*** 
.01 
16.68 
175.8***
30 
1202 
 
(.52) 
 
(.38) 
(.38) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(.01*10-2)
(.02) 
(.02) 
(.42) 
 (.70) 
(1.95) 
 (.01) 
(.01) 
(8.64) 
 
-1.00* 
 
 
 
 
.21 
-.39 
.27 
.80* 
 
-.04*10-3
-.01 
-.04 
-.02 
-.09 
-2.06 
.03*** 
.01 
18.31* 
186.4***
32 
1202 
 
(.52) 
 
 
 
 
(.31) 
(.42) 
(.27) 
(.40) 
 
(.01*10-2)
(.02) 
(.02) 
(.42) 
 (.68) 
(1.93) 
(.01) 
(.01) 
(8.42) 
 
-.92*  
 
-.76* 
.96* 
 
.30 
-.57 
.33 
.76* 
 
-.04*10-3
-.01 
-.04 
-.11 
-.01 
-1.84 
.03*** 
.01 
18.75* 
187.4***
34 
1202  
 
(.53) 
 
(.38) 
(.39) 
 
(.31) 
(.44) 
(.27) 
(.40) 
 
(.01*10-2) 
(.02) 
(.02) 
(.42) 
 (.69) 
(1.95) 
(.01) 
(.01) 
(8.52) 
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Table 5: Fixed Effects GLS Regression Models Predicting Market Performance (TSR) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Main Effect:  
Espousal of a shareholder value orientation 
Moderators (substance):  
Implementation of a shareholder value orientation 
Espousal * implementation of a SV orientation. 
Moderators (fit):    
Cultural fit 
Cultural fit * espousal of SV orientation 
Technical fit 
Technical fit * espousal of a SV orientation. 
Controls: 
Debt/external market capitalization 
Foreign sales/total sales 
Percentage of shares dispersed 
National network centrality 
Log of sales 
Leadership structure 
Return on assets 
Age 
Constant 
Wald Chi-square 
D.f. 
Number of Cases 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
.02*10-1 
-.15 
-.33** 
-3.05 
-10.78**
-10.46 
-.15 
1.98* 
2.07 
22.65***
21 
1205 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(.01*10-1)
(.12) 
(.11) 
(2.71) 
 (3.59) 
 (14.94) 
(.22) 
(.91) 
(72.60) 
 
-1.36 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
.02*10-1*
-.16 
-.31** 
-3.54 
-11.19**
-11.97 
-.15 
2.19* 
-8.08 
22.09***
22 
1205 
 
(3.17) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(.01*10-1)
(.12) 
(.11) 
(2.73) 
 (3.69) 
(15.16) 
(.22) 
(.89) 
(71.13) 
 
-1.78 
 
1.01 
1.77 
 
 
 
 
 
 
.02*10-1 
-.17 
-.31** 
-3.51 
-11.33**
-11.81 
-.17 
2.10* 
-3.76 
20.16***
24 
1205 
 
(3.16) 
 
(2.20) 
(2.38) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(.01*10-1)
(.12) 
(.11) 
(2.76) 
 (3.69) 
(15.34) 
(.27) 
(.94) 
(77.35) 
 
-1.98 
 
 
 
 
2.17 
151 
1.22 
.51 
 
.02*10-1 
-.16 
-.38*** 
-3.61 
-10.67**
-11.86 
-.17 
2.10** 
2.20 
19.23***
26 
1205 
 
(3.26) 
 
 
 
 
(2.21) 
(2.34) 
(2.11) 
(2.40) 
 
(.01*10-1)
 (.12) 
(.12) 
(2.76) 
 (3.69) 
(15.27) 
(.22) 
(.90) 
(72.55) 
 
-2.30 
 
1.01 
1.54 
 
2.19 
1.33 
1.40 
.30 
 
.02*10-1 
-.16 
-.39*** 
-3.60 
-10.82**
-11.87* 
-.20 
2.01** 
7.37 
17.78***
28 
1205  
 
(3.25) 
 
(2.24) 
(2.47) 
 
(2.21) 
(2.42) 
(2.14) 
(2.41) 
 
(.01*10-1) 
(.12) 
(.12) 
(2.78) 
 (3.68) 
(15.42) 
(.28) 
(.95) 
(78.65) 
* p<.05; ** p<.01; *** p<.001. Significance test are one-tailed for directional hypothesis and two-tailed for control variables. All models also 
control for industry and year effects (dummy variables). Robust standard errors are in parentheses. 
 
